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"Immigration is not a problem to be solved. It is a sign of
a confident and successful nation. "'
When President Bush spoke these words, America had a sense of
innocence and security that vanished following the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2002. Procedures regarding all aspects of immigration came
under close scrutiny. Those procedures that just days earlier were
criticized as being too restrictive, inhibiting business' ability to continue to
grow, now were being criticized for being too lax. On September 10, 2001,
the New York Times ran an article critical of U.S. consular officials in
China. The Department of State officials were "denying nonimmigrant
visa applications after interviewing the applicants for only a few minutes.
How could they reasonably DENY a visa with so little information?"' In
the course of one day, this thinking was turned upside down. How could
they reasonably approve a visa in that small amount of time?3
Post-September 11, 2001, the entire field of immigration and
naturalization law changed, including the H-1B visa program. Resulting
changes in the economy further compounded concern over the need for
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1. President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President at INS Naturalization
Ceremony (July 10, 2001).
2. Steven C. Bell, Where Are We Now? A Year Since September 11, 2001, IMMIGR. Bus.
NEWS & COMMENT, Sept. 15, 2002, available at 2002 WL 2020091 (emphasis added). See
also Elisabeth Rosenthal, Tough U.S. Visa Policy Riles Shut-Out Scholars in China, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 10, 2001, at Al, available at http://query.nytimes.comlsearch.
3. Bell, supra note 2.
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the H-1B visa program. Fear of foreigners, fear of a continued downturn
in the economy, fear over losing American jobs to "outsiders," and fear of
an all-encompassing economic unknown, has gripped the U.S. business
community and workforce.
This comment analyzes the current state of the H-1B visa program by
beginning with a brief historical look at the creation of the immigration
policy in the United States. Because immigrants founded this great nation,
the struggle between America's past and continuing immigration has been
a controversial subject throughout U.S. history as we seek to find a balance
between the fundamental ideals that created the United States and the
practical aspects of establishing a societal structure in which all citizens can
excel. Part II will provide an overview of the significance of each recent
legislative action taken by Congress. Part III lays a foundation of the
components and requirements of the H-1B visa program, in context with
other immigration law, explaining the process of attaining H-lB visa status
for employers and nonimmigrant employees. Part IV focuses on
enforcement of the H-IB program analyzing the structure Congress put in
place to manage and enforce immigration law and the ramifications of that
structure. Part V addresses specific areas of concern and the sources of
those concerns. Additionally, several individual cases of abuse will be
discussed.
This comment seeks to trace the validity of the criticisms of the H-1B
visa to determine if the policy in place is addressing the needs of business,
nonimmigrant aliens, and the U.S. workforce. Finally, since immigration
law has changed following the acts of terrorism on September 11, 2001,
and the economy is continuing to decline, this comment concludes with an
analysis of the current economic environment in light of the recent shift in
political power to determine how these changes may affect the H-1B visa
program.
II. HISTORY OF U.S. IMMIGRATION LAW
A. An Overview of U.S. Immigration Policy
To better understand immigration law in the United States as it exists
today, a brief look at the history of U.S. immigration law is beneficial.
Prior to the late 1800s, there was no immigration policy of the United
States.4 Immigration was unrestricted.' However, over time, "very basic
controls were established to prevent (exclude) the entry of criminals, the





diseased, and the insane."6 Due to the increasing number of immigrants
coming into the U.S. at the time, Congress enacted a general quota system
in 1921, entitled The Quota Law of 1921,' which established the first
quantitative restriction on immigration into the United States."
The framework for present-day U.S. immigration law was established
in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. 9 Congress has amended
immigration law since 1952 through many legislative acts, though most
notably in the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, the
Immigration Act of 1990," the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996," the American Competitiveness and
Workforce Improvement Act of 1998,13 and most recently, with the
American Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century Act of 2000.14
Following the implementation of a national procedure to handle
nonimmigrant employees in the U.S., three Acts have most significantly
changed the H-1B program: The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952,
the Immigration Act of 1990 and the American Competitiveness in the
Twenty-First Century Act of 1998, have most significantly changed the H-
1B program."
B. The Significance of Each Act to Immigrant Employment
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA) was the first
legislation to extensively revise immigration procedure in the United
6. Id.
7. 3A AM. JUR. 2D Aliens and Citizens § 3 (1998).
8. Id.
9. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952)
(codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2002)); Brian John Halliday, In Order to Hire the Best Person
for the Job, We Have to Do What?, 11 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 33, 35-36 (1999).
10. See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359
(1986) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2003)).
11. See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990) (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2003)).
12. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2003)).
13. See American Competitiveness and Workforce Improvement Act of 1998, Pub. L.
No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-691 (1998) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101
(2003)).
14. See American Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century Act of 2000, Pub. L. No.
106-313, 114 Stat. 1251 (2000) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2003)).
15. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Questions and Answers: Changes to the H-
lB Program (Nov. 21, 2000), at http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/publicaffairs/questions/
HlBchang.htm.
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States.16  The INA divided immigration into three general categories:
immigration intended to reunite families, immigration based on
employment, and immigration for humanitarian reasons." The INA
enacted both major and minor changes in U.S. immigration law that
continue to be good law today.' 8 Immigration laws, for the most part
beginning with the Immigration and Nationality Act in 1952 and
subsequent amendments, control the admission, exclusion, and
deportation of illegal immigrants. More importantly for the purposes of
this discussion, the INA implemented the labor certification requirement 9
and expanded previous quota systems implementing preferences for
persons with certain skills and occupations.20
The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA)
significantly changed certain aspects of the employment of immigrants and
the responsibilities of the employer.2' Under the IRCA, it became illegal
for U.S. employers to knowingly hire aliens not authorized by the
Immigration and Naturalization Service to work in the U.S.22 This
increased burden on employers came in the form of new procedures
requiring employers to verify documents of identity and permission to
work.23
The Immigration Act of 1990 (IA90) marked a "fundamental shift in
immigration thinking and priorities towards stronger consideration of
labor-market-oriented policies. Much of this shift in thinking can be
traced to the increasingly competitive global environment of the late
1980S.,,24 By requiring additional documentation and attestation, the
Immigration Act of 1990 significantly increased the burden on employers
and conferred greater power and additional duties on the Department of
Labor.
16. MENDELSON, supra note 4.
17. Lenni B. Benson, Breaking Bureaucratic Borders: A Necessary Step Toward
Immigration Law Reform, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 203, 214 (2002).
18. 3A AM. JUR. 2D Aliens and Citizens § 5 (1998).
19. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 212(a)(5) (codified as 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(5) (2003)).
20. 3A AM. JUR. 2D Aliens and Citizens § 5 (1998).
21. MENDELSON, supra note 4, at 1180.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Constantine S. Potamianos, The Temporary Admission of Skilled Workers to the
United States Under the H-lB Program: Economic Boon or Domestic Work Force Scourge?,
11 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 789. 797 (1997).
25. Angelo A. Paparelli & Mona D. Patel, The Immigration Act of 1990: Death Knell for
the H-IB?, 68 No. 2 INTERPRETER RELEASES 29, 30 (1991).
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The Immigration Act of 1990 substantially revised the categories of
employment separating out "specialty occupations," defined as
occupations requiring highly specialized knowledge and a bachelor's
26degree or its equivalent. Previously grouped occupations such as aliens
with extraordinary ability, accompanying aliens, and athletes and
entertainers, were given new "0" and "P" visa categories.27 The IA90
prolonged the time a nonimmigrant can work in the U.S. allowing for an
initial period of three years with a three-year extension, not to exceed six
years.' 8 Previously, Immigration and Naturalization Service regulations
allowed for a maximum of five years and a theoretical sixth year justified
only under "extraordinary circumstances.""
Most significantly, the Immigration Act of 1990 increased the cap for
H-lB visas to 65,000 annually, almost doubling the initial numbers allowed
under this category.0  In creating the additional categories for the
occupations previously grouped under the H-1B classification, the
legislation not only increased the overall number of visas available, but
also excluded previously included groups to allow for greater numbers of
skilled workers in "specialty occupations."
The Illegal Immigration Reform and Responsibility Act of 1996
(IIRRA) passed the legislature during a time of intense political pressure
to tighten immigration laws.I The purpose behind the legislation was to
curb illegal immigration by adding administrative procedures for
deportation, employment verification, border patrol and the
32
administration of public benefits to illegal immigrants. Congress
reasoned that restricting access to U.S. employers would result in lower
numbers of illegal immigrants entering the U.S. workforce and a decrease
in wage competition. Additionally, this legislation sought to achieve
other socioeconomic goals to reduce crime rates and decrease the burden
26. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 214(i)(1) (codified at 8 U.S.C. §
1184(i)(1) (2002)).
27. Immigration Act of 1990 § 207 (creating INA, §101(a)(15)(O)-(P)).
28. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 214(g)(4) (codified at 8 U.S.C. §
1184(g)(4); 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(15)(ii)(B)).
29. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(1 5)(ii)(A).
30. See Jung S. Hahm, Note, American Competitiveness and Workforce Improvement Act
of 1998: Balancing Economic and Labor Interests Under the New H-1B Visa program, 85
CORNELL L. REV. 1673, 1675 (2000).
31. Hiep D. Truong, Comment, The Illegal Immigration Reform and Responsibility Act
of 1996: A Cost-Effective Measure for the U.S. Citizens or a Punishment for Immigrants
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on legal U.S. workers who pay taxes for public assistance programs of
education, welfare, and health services utilized by illegal immigrants 4
Though some studies show this concern to be unfounded, it was a major
concern for supporters of the IIRRA3
The American Competitiveness and Workforce Improvement Act of
1998 (ACWIA) introduced additional regulation intended to protect U.S.
workers while allowing for a temporary increase in the number of available
H-1B visas.36 The significant changes set forth in the ACWIA set aside
additional funds for U.S. worker education and training.7 The Act
established that employers seeking to utilize the H-1B visa program must
pay for this through enhanced filing fees." The American Competitiveness
and Workforce Improvement Act came about as a direct response to
intense political pressure - from business in the midst of an economic
boom needing skilled employees, and from organized labor focused on
protecting U.S. workers.3 9
The American Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century Act
(AC21) was a continuation of the American Competitiveness and
Workforce Improvement Act reform. The AC21 increased the enhanced
filing fee paid by employers utilizing the H-1B visa program and provided
for a marked temporary increase in the number of H-1B visas available.40
The AC21 significantly increased the cap for the years immediately
following the legislation: 195,000 for FY2001, FY2002, and FY2003. 4' The
AC21 also addressed the backlog within the Immigration and
Naturalization Service processing by authorizing an additional fee the
34. Id. Concerns over immigrants using social services paid for by U.S. citizens and all
workers in the United States reportedly are unfounded. The enactment of Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986 was the result of this type of fear over massive
immigration through our southern border with Mexico in the 1980s. To counter this
concern, studies show immigrants experience economic inequality because though they pay
taxes in the United States, they are essentially contributing money to a system that does not
return benefits to them. Immigrants, who make up 10.2% of the population, pay about
10.6% in taxes, which totals about $7.2 billion . . . according to the Urban Institute, the
money paid by taxpaying immigrants more than offsets the costs of any public services they
might use, including education, welfare benefits, social security, and health services. See id.
at 58.
35. Id.
36. See 8 C.F.R. § 103.7(b) (1998).
37. See American Competitiveness and Workforce Improvement Act of 1998 § 414.
38. Id.
39. Hyacinth Leus, Using the H-lB Visa to Fill Staffing Needs with Foreign Professionals,
23 Los ANGELES LAW, Oct. 2000, at 25.
40. Hahm, supra note 30, at 1675.
41. American Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century Act of 2000 § 102.
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employer may pay to obtain faster service.4' The increase in the enhanced
filing fee charges a premium of $1,000 for faster service and guarantees the
employer a final decision on each case within fifteen days or less.
43
Additionally, the law exempted any H-1B petition filed before September
1, 2000, from the cap and exempted any nonimmigrant employed by an
institution of higher education or certain research organizations." These
exemptions resulted in additional H-1B visas available to business for the
inaugural year.
III. THE H-1B VISA AND RECENT LEGISLATION
A. The Economic Environment During Recent Legislative Reform
Historically, the U.S. has permitted foreign workers to come to the
U.S. on a temporary basis to fill jobs that U.S. employers could not fill with
American workers. 4' There has been long-standing conflict between the
legal U.S. workforce and the government's efforts to satisfy employers'
demand for inexpensive, reliable labor, historically for agricultural labor.46
This need has flourished into other sectors of the economy in recent times,
namely the technology and health care sectors.47 Based on the general
public's fear that "immigrants will depress the economy by taking jobs and
exhausting social security and other benefits, 48 the general U.S. policy of
closed borders conflicts with the need of business for skilled workers. Such
conflicting shifts in ideology have led to inconsistent policy,
implementation, and enforcement of immigration law.49
The dramatic expansion of the nonimmigrant visa program by
Congress in the IA90 was enacted to meet the technological explosion of
the 1990's.5' The legislation was generally met with positive feedback from
42. See 8 U.S.C. § 1356(u) (2002).
43. Id.
44. See American Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106-
313.
45. Diane Rezendez Khirallah, Where Does H-1B Fit, INFORMATION WEEK, Feb. 4, 2002,
at http://www.informationweek.comistorylwk2002020150021.
46. Catherine Halliday, Inheriting the Storied Pomp of Ancient Lands: An Analysis of the
Application of Federal Immigration Law on the United States' Northern and Southern
Borders, 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 181, 186 (2001).
47. Brian John Halliday, In Order to Hire the Best Person for the Job, We Have to Do
What?, 11 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 33, 38 (2002).
48. C. Halliday, supra note 46, at 185.
49. See id.
50. B. Halliday, supra note 47, at 36.
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the public and business sectors." At the time, the economy was growing
rapidly, especially in technology and the computer sciences, and U.S.
employers had a large number of professional-level vacancies that could
12
not be filled by U.S. workers. Technology employers claimed the needed
personnel were not available." In the decade following the expansion of
the H-1B visa program, the role of the program became clear: if employers
could not find skilled technology and other trained personnel, employers
could use the H-1B visa program to open up the global labor market for
these vacant positions.54
The H-1B visa is of particular interest to technology employers
because it is a means of obtaining foreign professional workers for
temporary employment.-" The Immigration and Nationality Act outlined
this type of visa by defining the required employment as: "a specialty
occupation which requires theoretical and practical application of a body
of highly specialized knowledge and attainment of a baccalaureate or
higher degree or its equivalent as a minimum requirement for entry into
the occupation in the United States."'56 When originally enacted, the H-1B
process was a straightforward process;57 however, recent legislation,
namely the American Competitiveness and Workforce Improvement Act
of 1998 and subsequent acts, have added complexity to the process in an
attempt to protect U.S. workers.58
Following the definition of the type of occupation that an H-1B visa
worker can fill, the basic requirements for a foreign worker to qualify for
the H-1B visa are: (1) full state licensure, if required for practice in a state;
51. Id.
52. Hahm, supra note 30, at 1674-75.
53. Id.
54. B. Halliday, supra note 47, at 38. Within U.S. immigration law, there exists a
sophisticated system of allowing immigrants from other nations into the U.S. based on
many factors in the overall system of immigration law. Specifically addressing the H-1B
users, "the majority of H-1B visas are granted to skilled workers from Asia: in 1999, 55,047
were granted to Asian Indians, 5,779 were granted to Chinese, 3,339 were granted to
Japanese, and 3,065 were granted to Filipinos." Sabrina Underwood, Note, Achieving the
American Daydream: The Social, Economic, and Political Inequalities Experienced by
Temporary Workers Under the H-1B Visa Program, 15 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 727, 731 (citing
Hanna Rosin, A Worn-Out Welcome Mat, WASH. POST, Sept. 16, 2000, at Al).
Additionally, "[s]ix out of the seven most ravenous users [businesses] of the H-1B visa
program are companies that are either owned by Indian nationals, or which are subsidiaries
of companies headquartered in India." B. Halliday, supra note 47, at 51-52.
55. B. Halliday, supra note 47, at 38.
56. 8 C.F.R. 214.2(h)(4)(i)(A)(1) (2002).




(2) a U.S. institution baccalaureate degree (or its foreign equivalent) in the
specific specialty or a related field as a minimum entry into the occupation;
or (3) education, training, or experience in the specialty equivalent to the
completion of a baccalaureate degree.
59
An employer must first demonstrate that the position the employer
seeks to fill requires a professionally degreed person or one possessing
professional-level experience.W Additionally, there must be a connection
between the applicant's degree, knowledge and the vacant position. 6' The
H-1B category typically includes professionals engaged in engineering,
architecture, computer programming, accounting, university-level
research, and medical science.62
B. Components of the H-1B Visa
There are three primary attestations required of an employer seeking
to utilize the H-1B visa program under the reform put in place by the
Immigration Act of 1990.6' The first is the prevailing wage requirement. 4
The Act requires U.S. employers seeking to utilize H-1B nonimmigrant
employees to attest that the employer will pay the H-1B nonimmigrant at
least ninety-five percent of the prevailing wage for the specialtyS 65
occupation. The employer can meet the prevailing wage requirement of
the Act by documenting the prevailing wage for the position sought or the
actual wage the employer currently pays to other workers if the position
currently exists. The actual wage is required if the wage is higher than the
prevailing wage in that labor market area.6 The employer can use either
the Department of Labor (DOL) wage figures compiled at the state level
or the employer may conduct a private wage survey for the prevailing
wage for positions of similar skill, education, and training in the geographic
67
area.
59. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 214(i)(2)(C)(ii) (codified as 8 U.S.C. §
1184(i)(2)(C)(ii)); 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(v), (iv).
60. See 8 U.S.C. § 1184(i)(1)(B).
61. Leus, supra note 39, at 24.
62. Jim Herron Zamora, INS Turns Blind Eye to Visas For High Tech, SAN FRANCISCO
EXAMINER, Feb. 25, 2000, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/
examiner/archive/2000/02/25/NEWS16145.dtl.
63. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 655.731-732 (2002).
64. See id. § 655.731(a) (2002).
65. See id. § 655.731(a)(2)(iii).
66. Paparelli & Patel, supra note 25, at 34.
67. 20 C.F.R. § 655.731(a)(2). It is often difficult for employers to establish prevailing
wage levels, especially for technology sector jobs where the duties are often individualized
or pioneering. An employer can elect to use Department of Labor (DOL) wage figures
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The second component of the program is that employers are required
to attest that the hiring will not adversely affect working conditions of
workers "similarly employed. 68 Much of the past debate concerning these
required attestations centered on the shift from in-house employees to
outsourcing non-core services,69 a phenomenon that has occurred in all
sectors of the U.S. economy over the past two decades.
The third component of the program is the attestation that hiring the
H-1B worker is in the absence of any lockout or strike." The employer
must review the application with the union representative or, if there is no
collective bargaining present in the workplace, the employer must post the
application for the current employees to review." Additionally, employers
must instruct employees on how to file a complaint with the DOL
concerning the H-1B employer or employee.
In addition to these attestations existing under the IA90, the
American Competitiveness and Workforce Improvement Act provided for
additional protection for U.S. workers by creating the distinction of an "H-
1B dependent" employer. 3 This classification is determined by taking an
employer's total number of employees against the number of H-1B visa
workers.7 4 For companies that are H-1B dependent under the guidelines,
established by occupational classifications defined in the DOL's Dictionary of
Occupational Titles. However, these are typically generalized categories of mainstream
occupations - not what an H-1B employer needs. If the occupation is easily categorized,
the employer is less likely to need a foreign specialty-skilled employee. Another drawback
for an employer using DOL figures is that once an employer requests the prevailing wage
from its state employment agency, the employer must use that figure. There is no
procedure for protest. Alternately, the employer can commission a wage survey privately.
However, this can be costly and carries with it similar problems of reliability regarding
difficulty in classifying occupations. Additionally, competitors and other employers are
often reluctant to share wage information. Paparelli & Patel, supra note 25, at 36.
68. See 20 C.F.R. § 655.730(d)(2) (2002).
69. Stuart Anderson, Widespread Abuse of H-1Bs and Employment-Based Immigration?
The Evidence Says Otherwise, 73 No. 19 INTERPRETER RELEASES 637, 649 (1996).
70. See 20 C.F.R. § 655.733(a) (2002).
71. 20 C.F.R. § 655.730(d)(4).
72. B. Halliday, supra note 47, at 45.
73. Id.
74. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(n)(3)(A)(i)(I) and (II) define an H-1B dependent employer as
either: (I) A company that has twenty-five or fewer "full-time equivalent" employees
employed in the United States and employs more than seven H-1B non-immigrants. (II) A
company that employs twenty-six to fifty full-time equivalent employees in the United
States and employs more than twelve H-1B non-immigrants. 8 U.S.C. §§
1182(n)(2)(A)(ii)(I) and (II) define an H-1B dependent employer for companies that
employ fifty-one or more full-time equivalent employees in the United States. The
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or those classified as "willful violators"75 at any time while employing an
H-1B employee, the ACWIA requires two additional attestations. 6 The
first attestation is designed to protect the U.S. worker from lay-offs by
requiring the employer to attest that the employer has not laid off any U.S.
worker ninety days prior to or following the filing for a H-1B visa." The
second requirement is that the employer must have attempted to recruit
U.S. workers for the position to be filled by the H-1B nonimmigrant
worker.78
These attestations comprise the underlying documents required to
determine eligibility for the H-1B visa program, beginning with the Labor
Condition Application (LCA).9 The LCA is a short form from the DOL
necessary to begin the process for obtaining H-1B status for nonimmigrant
employees... The DOL established that the labor certification process
involving the mandatory requirement that H-1B dependent employers
must attempt to locate a qualified U.S. worker to fill the position is under
the supervision of the state department of labor where the employer is
located.81  This requires the employer to recruit U.S. workers using
advertisements in newspapers or trade journals and by placing a job order
with the state employment service. The H-lB dependent employer must
evaluate, possibly interview the respondents, and report the results of the
search to the DOL. The Department of Labor will only certify a Labor
Condition Application for a nonimmigrant employee if the employer
cannot find a willing, qualified U.S. worker within a prescribed recruitment
period. If the DOL certifies the application, the employer's next step in
the process is to petition the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
for H-1B status for a particular nonimmigrant employee.
company is considered H-1B dependent if the number of its H-1B visa nonimmigrant
employees reaches fifteen percent of the company's full-time equivalent employees.
75. Willful violators are companies that intentionally fail to meet the LCA attestations
or willfully misrepresent a material fact in filing the LCA. See 8 U.S.C. §§
1182(n)(2)(C)(i)(l)-(II), (i)1-l) ii()(I,(2)(F).
76. See American Competitiveness and Workforce Improvement Act of 1998 § 412.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(B)(1) (2002).
80. See 20 C.F.R. § 655.730(a) (2002); B. Halliday, supra note 47, at 42.




85. B. Halliday, supra note 47, at 45. The INS is a division of the Department of Justice.
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Once the U.S. employer has determined the prevailing wage for the
job(s) it seeks to fill and has obtained a certified Labor Condition
Application from the Department of Labor, the employer may prepare
and file the actual H-lB petition with the INS. 86 The petition consists of
two Department of Justice (DOJ) forms: Form 1-129 and the H
Classification Supplement.
Department of Justice Form 1-129 requires the employer to submit
information about itself including its location and financial information."
The form also requests information on the current nonimmigrant status of
the employee, 9 a brief description of the job to be filled,'o the duration of
the intended employment including dates,91 and the salary to be paid. 92
The second DOJ form is the H Classification Supplement.93 This
requires a complete job description, 94 the employee's current occupation,9'
and a summary of the employee's employment history." Additionally, the
employer must also include a letter of support for the employee,97
86. Id.
87. See 20 C.F.R. § 655.700(b)(2) (2002). Concerns voiced by business over required
confidential disclosures led to the use of two different forms. Potential employers had
legitimate concerns that competitors could obtain trade secrets or confidential information
in public documents required in the filings. To address this issue, the INS separated the
information in the 1-129 more general form, and the H Classification Supplement requiring
full disclosure of confidential employee information. Paparelli & Patel, supra note 25, at
38.
88. 20 C.F.R. § 655.700(b)(2).
89. This requirement ties into another aspect of the Act regarding the use by employers
to petition for permanent labor certification. This use of the H-1B program by employers
has been highly criticized, though this usage was clearly allowed in the IA90. In the IA90,
Congress allowed "dual intent" for H aliens. This classification allows a nonimmigrant to
enter on an H-1B petition and subsequently petition for permanent status. Employers may
sponsor foreign nationals who are already in the U.S. for H-1B or permanent status. The
H-1B visa allows an employer to obtain an employee within a reasonable amount of time
while the petition for permanent status typically take as long as two years. Rarely would an
employer be able to wait two years to fill an opening. Anderson, supra note 69, at 638-39.
90. See Petition for Nonimmigrant Worker, Form 1-129, available at
http://www.ins.gov/graphics/formsfee/forms/index.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2003).
91. Id.
92. Id. An employer may use Form 1-129 to petition for an extension of stay for all
classifications of business nonimmigrant employees, including the H-1B classification.
93. See H Classification Supplement, available at http:/fwww.ins.gov/graphics/formsfee/







98including: a description of the company, the specialty occupation being
offered to the potential employee," and the individual's qualifications for
the position.'l° Other documentation must accompany the petition to
demonstrate the employee's specialty skills required for certification under
this program.' °1  Such documentation must demonstrate that the
beneficiary possesses necessary licensure (if required), and documentation• - 102
of a post-baccalaureate degree, or its equivalent. To complete this
petition to the INS, the employer must again include the certified Labor
Condition Application along with the Form 1-129, H Supplement, the
employer letter of support, and all documentary evidence.'03
Once the U.S. employer has compiled the necessary forms, the
employer may file the petition in one of four regional Immigration and
Naturalization Service offices that has jurisdiction over the intended H-1B
visa employee's place of employment.'9 The petition must be
accompanied by the required filing fee, a bifurcated fee consisting of at. 105
base fee and an enhanced filing fee. Enhanced filing fees were
established in the American Competitiveness and Workforce
Improvement Act which increased the base filing fee to $110 and
incorporated the additional enhanced filing fee of $500 to be used for job
training and education programs for U.S. workers.' Subsequent
legislative reform in the American Competitiveness in the Twenty-First
Century Act has increased the base filing fee to $130 and the enhanced
filing fee to $1,000.070
The additional enhanced filing fee must come from the employer!
The beneficiary cannot pay this fee, nor can the beneficiary be required to
reimburse the petitioner in any way. °9 This provision has been at issue in
98. id.
99. See H Classification Supplement, supra note 93.
100. Id.
101. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iv)(A) (2002).
102. See id. § 214.2 (h)(4)(iv)(A), (v).
103. See 20 C. F.R. § 655.730(b) (2002).
104. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(2)(i)(A).
105. See id. § 103.7(b)(1).
106. Id.
107. Id. The Code of Federal Regulations establishes the following fee structure in Form
1-129: Form 1-129. For filing a petition for a nonimmigrant worker, a base fee of $130. For
filing an H-1B petition, a base fee of $130 plus an additional $1,000 fee in a single
remittance of $1,130. The remittance may be in the form of one or two checks (one in the
amount of $1,000 and the other in the amount of $130).
108. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(19)(ii).
109. See id. § 214.2(h)(19)(i).
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complaints filed by H-1B visa holders against contract employers utilizing
H-1B visas." ° More recent legislation"' allows for the enhanced filing fee
to be waived if the employer is an "institution of higher education, '"" 2 a
"non-profit entity (including but not limited to hospitals and medical or
research institutions) that is connected or associated with an institution of
higher education,""' or a "research organization that is either a nonprofit
organization or entity that is primarily engaged in basic research and/or
applied research or a United States Government entity whose primary
mission is the performance or promotion of basic research and/or applied
research."",1
4
Congress created the enhanced filing fee in the enactment of the
ACWlA. ll5 The enhanced H-1B filing fee amounted to a tax on employers
and served as a political compromise. Congress intended for the revenue
collected to fund scholarships and training endeavors for U.S. workers."
6
This provision addressed the political concerns of those backed by
organized labor battling the replacement of U.S. with foreign workers,
opposing others who believed the labor crunch in the U.S. was holding
back economic growth."7  The addition of the enhanced filing fee
demonstrated the dual agenda of Congress that continues today with the
recently enacted increase in the enhanced filing fee in the American
Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century Act." 8
While the AC21 increased the number of available H-1B visas, it also
provided additional protection for U.S. workers through the additional
funding from the enhanced filing fee."9 Congress addressed the short-
term, immediate goals of business by increasing the cap for H-1B visas
over the following three years (through 2003).120 While at the same time
addressing long-term goals of many by increasing the funding for training
and workforce development of U.S. workers apparently unequipped to fill
the needs of technology employers. Estimates in February 2002 by a
110. Babu Thanu Chellen, et al. vs. John Pickle Co. Inc., No. 02-CV-85 EA (N.D. Okla.
filed Feb. 1, 2002).
111. See American Competitiveness and Workforce Improvement Act of 1998 § 415.
112. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(19)(iii)(A).
113. Id. § 214.2(h)(19)(iii)(B).
114. Id. § 214.2(h)(19)(iii)(C).
115. American Competitiveness and Workforce Improvement Act of 1998 § 414.
116. See id.




121. See Hahm, supra note 30, at 1674.
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pro-business lobbyist group favoring increases in the H-1B visa cap
reported that employers in the H-1B program have "contributed more
than $100 million" through the enhanced filing fee to retrain U.S.
workers.
1 2
After the employer files the necessary forms and documentary
evidence with the proper Immigration and Naturalization Service
•. • 123
processing center, the INS will process the application. This process
timeline varies depending on many factors, the most important of which is
the regional INS processing center that handles the application.2A Under
the best of circumstances an application takes sixty days, though some
processing centers (namely Texas and California) can take much longer.
126Provided the federal cap has not been reached, under the best of
circumstances the Immigration and Naturalization Service notifies the
employer that the H-1B visa has been approved. 12' The certification of the
Labor Condition Application by the Department of Labor and approval
by the Immigration and Naturalization Service is generally thought to be a
rubber-stamp process resulting in little more than paper shuffling.1
21
122. Harris N. Miller, Do We Still Need As Many H-1B Visas?: Yes, OPTIMIZE MAG., Feb.
2002, at http://www/optimizemag.com/issue/oo4/squareoff-yes.htm.
123. B. Halliday, supra note 47, at 45.
124. The INS service centers in Texas and California, which handle cases in the southern
half of the country, are known to have slow processing times. B. Halliday, supra note 47, at
43, 45.
125. B. Halliday, supra note 47, at 45. Some sources claim application processing times
approach three to four years. Benson, supra note 17, at 301.
126. Prior to the American Competitiveness and Workforce Improvement Act of 1998,
the annual cap stood at 65,000. In 1998, the H-1B visa cap was reached for the first time,
leaving many business in need of skilled workers. To address this, Congress passed the
American Competitiveness and Workforce Improvement Act of 1998, which increased the
number of H-1B visas for the following three years (115,000 in FY1999; 115,000 in FY2000;
and 107,500 in FY2001). American Competitiveness and Workforce Improvement Act of
1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 411, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-642. The trend is toward reducing the
number of H-1B visas in coming years. On October 17, 2000, the American
Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century Act, Pub. L. 106-313, established the
following number of H-1B visas: 195,000 for FY2001, FY2002, and FY2003, before
returning to 65,000 in FY2004.
127. Leus, supra note 39, at 24.
128. Anderson, supra note 69, at 639; Paparelli & Patel, supra note 25, at 42. In a debate
over technical corrections in reform to the INA, Sen. Alan K. Simpson (R-Wyo.) declared
on the Senate floor that "[t]he H-lB corrections underscore that enforcement of the
program's labor condition application process is complaint driven and that the Department
of Labor's responsibility is to check applications they receive only for completeness and
obvious inaccuracies." Anderson, supra note 69, at 644.
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The third and final governmental agency that must review the
application following the Department of Labor and the Immigration and
Naturalization Service is the Department of State (DOS).129  Upon
approval by the INS of the employer's petition, the foreign worker must
visit the U.S. consulate or embassy under the Department of State in their
country of origin and obtain a H-1B visa stamp on his or her passport. If
they are currently in the U.S., the foreign worker must visit the regional
INS processing center and go through an "adjustment of status.''
Following approval by the DOS, the worker can then arrive in the U.S. to
112begin employment with the employer that filed the H-1B visa petition.
IV. ENFORCEMENT
A. Congressional Intent for Implementation and Enforcement
Enforcement is a key area of criticism of the H-1B program.133
Congress intended in the Immigration Act of 1990 that the initiation to
investigate H-1B violations would be complaint-driven.34 Proponents of
the H-1B program have interpreted this to mean that the Department of
Labor should respond to specific complaints rather than broadly
investigate on its own.' However, in the final rule created by the DOL,
the DOL granted itself broad authority to investigate companies without
• ,-.. • • • 136
having received specific complaints.
Congress built safeguards into the LCA intending to protect U.S.
workers in the American Competitiveness and Workforce Improvement
Act.'37 The additions of requiring notice to union representatives in the
129. Leus, supra note 39, at 25.
130. Id.
131. Benson, supra note 17, at 220.
132. Leus, supra note 39, at 25.
133. See B. Halliday, supra note 47, at 48.
134. Anderson, supra note 69, at 644. In addition to enforcement driven by complaints,
Congress enacted heavy penalties in an effort to deter abuse such as: upon finding an
employer has not paid wages at the required wage level, the DOL may order the employer
to pay back wages; if a H-1B employee is dismissed prematurely, the employer must pay
reasonable costs of the alien's return transportation abroad; and perhaps, the most severe
sanction is the minimum one-year ban on future INS approvals of employer-sponsored
business visas if the employer violates agency regulations regarding the H-1B visa
requirements. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2 (h)(4)(i)(A)(5); Paparelli & Patel, supra note 25, at 37.
135. Id.
136. Anderson, supra note 69, at 644.
137. Hahm, supra note 30, at 1676.
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LCA process," 8 or publicizing the LCA in conspicuous locations giving
notice to existing employees if no union exists, 9 and posting of contact
information on how to notify the Department of Labor of complaints'
4°
were intended to provide for a means to report complaints or non-
compliance with the program. By making the program complaint-driven,
Congress wanted to incorporate a safeguard that would neither burden the
employer with excessive reporting measures, nor require governmental
surveillance of their employment practices.14' Congress designed the
reporting requirements in obtaining a H-1B visa along with the complaint-
driven enforcement for administrative ease for both the employers and
governmental agencies, with the overall goal to provide safeguards for
existing U.S. workers.
142
Congress' selection of particular agencies reflects some of the
complex policy goals of the Immigration and Naturalization Act. The
Department of Labor protects U.S. labor and provides expertise on labor
conditions. 14' The Department of State operates as a pre-screener of
immigrants before they reach our shores and aids in the identification of
undesirable aliens based on the consular officer's understanding of a
foreign country's conditions.' 44  The Immigration and Naturalization
Service identifies aliens entitled to immigration benefits and removes those
persons not authorized to reside in the United States.45 Because Congress
established in the act that three federal agencies were to implement
immigration laws "without any one agency having authority over the other
two, Congress laid the foundation for conflict and confusion.""
138. Anderson, supra note 69, at 643; Immigration Act of 1990 § 205(c)(3) (creating
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 212(n)(2)(A)); 20 C.F.R. § 655.730(d)(4)(i)(A)
(2002).
139. 20 C.F.R. § 655.730(d)(4)(i)(A) (2002).
140. Id. Additionally, the Immigration Act of 1990 as well as the Administrative
Procedure Act requires "the Secretary of Labor to establish a procedure to hear and decide
complaints from persons or organizations alleging that any of the foregoing conditions has
not been satisfied, or that the employer's LC Application contains a material
misrepresentation of fact." Paparelli & Patel, supra note 25, at 36. See generally 5 U.S.C. §
556. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(2)(C)(i)(I), (i)(I), (ii)(I), (ii)(11), (iii)(l), (iii)(II), (F) for
procedures regarding agency hearings.
141. Anderson, supra note 69, at 643-644.
142. Id. at 644.
143. Benson, supra note 17, at 218.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 218-19. Additionally, this article offers excellent further discussion of the
bureaucratic "three-headed monster" created by Congress. Id. at 315.
146. Id. at 274.
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Enforcement of the H-1B visa program can occur either through the
efforts of the Department of Labor or the Immigration and Naturalization
Service. 147 The requirements of the Labor Condition Application are the
most often-cited reasons for reporting abuse, which is within the scope of
enforcement under the Department of Labor. 48 The complaint is the
underpayment of wages, which typically comes from the H-1B employee
himself.149 This contradicts the often-cited stereotype by H-1B opponents
of foreign-born workers as docile, indentured servants that must be avidly
protected."s Co-workers, as well as business competitors of the employer,
are other sources for LCA-related complaints.' Congress specifically built
these safeguards into the legislation to result in this type of reporting.
The Immigration and Naturalization Service's role in enforcement
focuses on the employee's status.52  While the majority of H-1B
enforcement is incidental to the LCA requirements, which falls within the
duties of the Department of Labor, the Immigration and Naturalization
153Service also has a role in enforcement. Generally, the INS acts as a
gatekeeper of U.S. borders in addition to initiating investigations.1
4
Historically, their role has revolved around activities such as: "smuggling,
fraud, terrorism, detention and the patrol of our borders.' 1 5 However,
through the Immigration Reform and Control Act, Congress delegated
enforcement and investigative powers concerning the employment of
individuals to the INS." 6
Enforcement of the H-1B visa requirements appear to be lower on the
INS's priority list. Prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the
INS's mandated priorities were mostly based on political pressure. With
regard to foreigners, the INS was focused on "finding foreigners who ha[d]
expired student and tourist visas or who pose[d] a criminal threat.', 157 In
2001, an employer utilizing H-1B employees realized the INS's lack of
enforcement when he was forced by the market to terminate six of twelve
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Anderson, supra note 69, at 644.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See B. Halliday, supra note 47, at 46.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. See IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS §
103.1 (1999).
156. B. Halliday, supra note 47, at 46.
157. Khirallah, supra note 45.
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H-1B consultants' After unsuccessful attempts to find them other
assignments, he offered to pay for airline tickets home. 9 "Most said they
were going to stay in the United States," according to the employer.' 6 As
required by law, the employer reported to the INS that his sponsorship of
the H-1B visa holders was over, though he says it made no difference.'
6
'
He claimed the report disappeared "into a black hole" once sent to the
INS, claiming the foreign workers stayed in the U.S. illegally.
B. Congressional Structure of Agencies Overseeing Immigration
By enacting vague legislation, Congress can appear tough on
immigration and at the same time insulate itself from the complaints of its
constituents. 63 In the organic statutes enacted by Congress regarding
different types of business immigration, confusion and duplication have
created delay and redundancy.' 64  The immigration laws created by
Congress have rendered lawyers, immigrants, and employers confused and
frustrated. 65 How can the employers or employees have trust in the
system t6' if immigration lawyers struggle to keep up with the politically
pressured shifts in focus and priorities within the agencies as dictated by
Congress?6 7 The procedure and enforcement of the components of the H-
1B visa remains a moving target that lacks predictable results.'6  An
administrative law scholar described the INA and subsequent legislation
as:
In business immigration, Congress has done little beyond delegating
responsibility to a three-headed monster. It has not only failed to
specify details of the adjudicatory system, but also has left to the
agencies the job of delineating the specific content and definition of far
too many vague substantive categories. Vague standards necessitate a
process to determine who qualifies under the standard.j
69
158. Id.




163. Benson, supra note 17, at 274.
164. Id. at 262.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 264.
167. Id. at 262.
168. Id. at 265.
169. Benson, supra note 17, at 265.
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The challenge of each governmental agency creating regulations
implementing the organic statute is that each has interpreted
Congressional intent in a different way creating very different adjudication
procedures based on their agency history and habit.170 The Department of
Labor rarely issues formal rules, yet the procedure to review the denial of
labor certifications is the most formal procedure outlined by any of the
three agencies. Following the denial of a labor certification by a regional
officer, the employer may appeal to an Administrative Law Judge who
172hears Department of Labor appeals only.
In contrast to the Department of Labor formal appeal procedures,
"the Department of State routinely promulgates regulations under the full
rule-making procedures of the ADA [Administrative Procedure Act] and
publishes a Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) containing instructions
regarding the application of the regulations.'7 3  The DOS regularly
communicates changes in procedure or special emergencies to its field
offices, as opposed to the INS where open communication and
174documentation are rare.
In contrast to both the Department of Labor and Department of
State, the Immigration and Naturalization Service historically has a pattern
of failing to adopt regulations altogether."' The INS has been very
176inconsistent in adopting rules creating standards of procedure. For
example, the INS proposed a rule establishing "as a matter of discretion"
standards to determine when an applicant should be granted adjustment of
status. Prior to approval, the INS withdrew its own proposal for fear that
any list of factors would be unnecessarily rigid and impossible to foresee.77
Their concern was primarily based on the fear that clearly stated standards
would increase litigation, preferring instead to remain flexible by utilizing
discretion. Administrative law experts contend however, that the
Immigration and Naturalization Service could achieve greater uniformity
operating more efficiently if there were clearly established rules in place.78
Further, administrative law experts argue that by creating clearer rules,
170. Id.
171. Id. at 266.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 265.
174. Id. at 266.
175. Benson, supra note 17, at 267.
176. Id.




they would provide stronger precedent and reduce the amount of
litigation.
179
Congress failed to specify the nature of the procedure for
implementation of the Immigration and Naturalization Act, severely
undermining the system.) ° An example of this is the labor certification.
The Immigration and Naturalization Act states that the Secretary of Labor
grants a labor certification, but is silent as to the adjudication process the
agency must follow.8 0  As a result, the agency has developed a
cumbersome, bureaucratic process for determining wage information, and
shortages of the occupation in question. 18  The statute is regularly
challenged by employers opposing agency procedure because it generally
refers to the certification of no "able, willing, qualified ... and available"
U.S. worker."' The employers successfully argued that unless the
Department of Labor could specifically point to an available worker to fill
the position, the employer should receive the certification."" To this
perceived loophole getting much attention from employers, the DOL
responded by requiring additional procedure.'86 The additional procedure
required a case-by-case consideration of the recruitment process utilized
187
by the employer to ensure that no such worker existed. This is just one
example of the results of Congress' failure to carefully consider the
procedural implications of its legislation, which resulted in additional,
cumbersome procedure.18
179. Id.; Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65,
76-77 (1983).




184. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(5)(A)(i)(I) (2002).
185. See, e.g., Digilab, Inc. v. Sec'y of Labor, 495 F.2d 323 (1st Cir. 1974) (a specialized
applicant applied twice for H-1B status and was denied based on the DOL's determination
that there were available U.S. workers. However, the court found the agency had no proof
of the available workers qualified to meet the specialized needs of the employer.), cert.
denied 419 U.S. 840 (1974); Reddy, Inc. v. Dep't of Labor, 492 F.2d 538 (5th Cir. 1974) (the
visa was improperly denied where the administrator based the decision on a national
market for engineers of a different kind. The court remanded for reconsideration of the
application based upon the availability of civil engineers with plaintiff employee's
specialization within the area of the alien's intended residence).
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Processing in some parts of the U.S. can take, in the extreme case, up
to four years.'89 As a result, Congress has implemented budget reductions
out of frustration with the Department of Labor's lengthy process for
reviewing applications.' 90 DOL has responded with new systems of
computerized review that measure applications with proscribed
Department of Labor employment criteria. Ideally, automation should
result in approval without participation from the DOL or state agency
personnel speeding up the application process.""
The difficulty with one agency becoming less restrictive and allowing
more applicants through with less review potentially conflicts with the
other two agencies involved. As more concern over the Department of
Labor process grows, the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the
Department of State are more likely to lose trust in DOL certification
approvals and step up their procedures to ensure integrity in the
application process.'92 Thus, procedures become muddied resulting in less
understanding of and trust in the system overall.
There are many examples of direct conflict between the three agency
interpretations of the legislative intent regarding procedure.' 93 Decisions
by one agency can affect another compounding the problems of
inefficiency and redundancy. An example of this is a decision by the INS
to process business immigration at its regional service centers, as opposed
to one centralized location as in the past.' 94 By doing this, the INS in effect
separated the filing into a two-step process (one step processed at the
central office and the additional step processed at the regional center) of
naturalization petition adjudication and adjustment of status procedures
with the existing staff resources.' 95 This slowed down the overall process
by duplicating many of the agency procedures.'96 As delays compounded,
petitioners began avoiding the common adjustment of status application
and instead switched to overseas immigrant processing through the
Department of State.
197
The difficulty in avoiding the Immigration and Naturalization Service
procedures by applying for different status under the Department of State
is that at the time of the initial filing, the employer and immigrant indicate
189. Id.
190. Id. at 273.
191. Id.
192. Benson, supra note 17, at 263-73.
193. Id. at 277.






that they seek an adjustment of status (the final processing sought). 9'
Because of this designation, the INS does not send a formal notice of the I-
140 approval to the DOS.' 99 Before the DOS will accept jurisdiction, the
employer must request that the INS send the written notice (1-140) to the
DOS confirming their approval. In going down an alternate path, the
employer adds processes to the already backed up procedure of obtaining
a change in status for their employee.)° As a result, longer waiting periods
compound the problem by requiring additional processing and
communication between the agencies.20
Due to the delay in processing, employers are utilizing alternative
avenues to bring workers into the U.S.2°2 Alternative methods used by
employers and immigrants have created unintended consequences in other
agencies. The growth and tremendous backlog in the adjustment of status
claims has created a sharp increase in the Department of State's processing
of immigrant visas."" By Congress' decision to delegate power to three
governmental agencies in the INA and subsequent legislation, "Congress
failed to consider the good operation of the system as a whole. When no
agency is in control of the entire process, the decision of one to require a
new filing or original approval notices, complicates and expands the work
of another agency." 20 4  Attorneys and employers have attempted to
minimize the delay and confusion by filing duplicate petitions and
subsequently abandoning the slower track, which creates even more work
205for the agencies. While this is understandable in representing one's
client zealously, this was not what Congress intended.
C. Controls on Agency Function
Much of the responsibility for agency inefficiency and confusion lies
with Congress. With each amendment to the Immigration Naturalization
Act, Congressional mandates implied or expressed new priorities and
threaten to reduce funding or impose new statutory requirements.0 0 This
shift in priorities can have several effects on agencies. One such effect is
198. Benson, supra note 17, at 279.
199. Id. "Form 1-140. For filing a petition to classify preference status of an alien on the
basis of profession or occupation under section 204(a) of the Act- $135.00." 8 C.F.R. §
103.7(b)(1) (2002).
200. Benson, supra note 17, at 279.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 281.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Benson, supra note 17, at 282.
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an agency's mission can change rapidly and often. Each new mandate is
presented as a crisis, an emergency that must be tackled full-force.2 7 Thus,
employees are pulled from other required areas to manage the crisis and
implement the change, which in turn creates a backlog in other areas of the208
agency. These amendments and priority shifts create frustration and a
209decline in morale in agency employees.
In addition to obstacles placed by Congress on agency procedure, an
overriding fear that people are "getting through" the system is prevalent
throughout the agencies.1  Because H-1B visas are limited in number, the
fear is held throughout the system of false positives, foreigners and
employers committing fraud or being admitted mistakenly.21 ' Fear within
an administrative agency can greatly affect agency efficiency.
V. CRITICISMS OF THE H-1B VISA PROGRAM
A. Criticism Centered on Enforcement
Criticism has centered on enforcement for good reason - there
appears to be very little. Because much of the emphasis in the past has
been on the Labor Condition Application portion of the H-1B visa
procedure, little resources have been focused on enforcement of the
212
program. However, following the terrorism attacks of September 11,
2001, there has been a dramatic shift. There now exists a "zero tolerance"
policy on all immigration violations. 21 Prior to September 11, 2001, few
claims of abuse were made when compared with the number of visas
issued, with little verification of compliance by employers and employees.
Of the abuse that is reported, much centers on the prevailing wage
214
requirement .
The following case is an example of a nonimmigrant attempting to
benefit personally by fraudulently using the H-1B visa program. A native
of India, Ravishanker Balakrishna waged a Department of Labor
complaint regarding the prevailing wage requirement against his employer,
207. See id. at 286.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 284.
210. Id. at 289.
211. Id.
212. Benson, supra note 17, at 285.
213. Bell, supra note 3, at 1.
214. See Department of Labor, Labor Condition Applications, at http://www.oalj.dol.gov
(last visited Feb. tO, 2003).
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11 • 5Seymour 2lectric. The case involved a nonimmigrant alien who
conspired with Seymour Electric to apply for a H-1B visa as a computer
programmer, an occupation well within the required "specialty
occupation" requirement of the H-1B visa classification. 16 Balakrishna
claimed he was paid far below the prevailing wage established in the Labor
Condition Application completed by Seymour Electric. 17 The employer,
however, never intended to hire him as a nonimmigrant employee and was
able to prove this in a hearing before an administrative law judge.1 8
Balakrishna answered an advertisement Seymour Electric ran for an
accounting position. He was hired to work in accounting and as a favor,
Seymour Electric agreed to sponsor him for an H-1B visa in order for him
to obtain permission to work in the U.S.9 While an employer is required
to comply with the terms and conditions established in the LCA, the
nonimmigrant employee cannot seek vindication under the Act for aS220
situation resulting from his own misconduct. Because Balakrishna was
not a victim, but rather a perpetrator of fraud, the court would not allowhim o beefi fro his , .221
him to benefit from his wrongdoing. Therefore, the presiding
administrative law judge ruled in favor of Seymour Electric against
requiring the payment of back wages . 22 Additionally however, the
Department of Labor administrative law judge forwarded the matter to
the Immigration and Naturalization Service for appropriate disposition in
the action of both Balakrishna and Seymour Electric."'
Another case regarding the prevalent wage requirement is Yano
Enterprises v. Department of Labor.2" The employer, Yano Enterprises,
225
underpaid the employee a total of $102,797 over a six-year period. Yano
filed a labor condition application stating an annual salary of $30,000, but
paid the non-immigrant H-1B worker only $5.00 per hour.22' An additional
issue appealed in the case was whether the court could apply a housing
215. Ravishanker Balakrishna v. Seymour Elec., Inc., 2000-LCA-6 (Dec. 22, 2000),
available at http://www.oalj.dol.gov/public/ina/decsn/001ca06a.htm.
216. 8 U.S.C. § 1184(i)(1) (2002).






223. Balakrishna, supra note 215.
224. Yano Enter., Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, ARB No. 01-050, ALJ No. 2001-LCA-1
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offset to the damages assessed because the employee lived with the
employer, a former college roommate, during this time. The agency
administrator ordered a housing credit of $10,500 reflecting the value of• 22829
the housing provided. However, the administrative law judge 12 noted
that under 20 C.F.R. § 655.731(c)(7)(iii), a deduction is only allowed if it is
made voluntarily in a written authorization from the employee."3 No such
writing existed between the parties. Accordingly, the administrative law
judge directed Yano to pay the total amount of back wages due without
231
allowing for the housing deduction.
An interesting fact in this case is the occupation Yano sought to fill:
"Personnel Manager." This occupation does not appear to fit the
"specialty occupation" classification required in the Act. Nor does it seem
likely that a U.S. worker could not be found to fill the vacant personnel
manager position. Because employment classification is addressed in the
LCA, which was seemingly approved by the DOL, this fact was not
discussed in the case.
B. Criticism Based on the Protection of U.S. Workers
Much of the criticism of the H-1B program focuses on claims of
oppression by U.S. businesses attempting to find cheap labor to replace
232higher paid U.S. workers. Over the past decade, the criticism has
generally fallen among political party lines."' During the Clinton
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. The Department of Labor has established that the standard of review for
immigration proceedings is governed by the Administrative Procedure Act. See generally 5
U.S.C.A. § 557 (2002). The acting Administrator determines the validity of the claim and
assesses the amount due the parties, if any. An appeal goes to a panel comprised of a two-
member board, as authorized by Secretary's Order 2-96. 61 Fed. Reg. 19,978 § 5 (May 2,
1996) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 2.8 (1996)). If the party seeks to appeal the decision by the
panel, it goes to an Administrative Law Judge for the Department of Labor for a hearing
on the matter. Yano, ALJ No. 2001-LCA-1 at nn.1, 4.
230. 20 C.F.R. § 655.731(c)(9)(iii)(A) (2002).
231. Yano, AL No. 2001-LCA-1.
232. Critics of the H-lB program claim that "University studies have shown that H-1B
programmers and engineers are paid 15% to 33% below the U.S. average, and the Wall
Street Journal has reported that holders of H-1Bs are paid $20,000 to $25,000 less annually
than comparably skilled Americans." Tom Tancredo, Do We Still Need As Many H-1B
Visas?: No, OPTIMIZE MAG., Feb. 2002, at http://www/optimizemag.com/issue/004/
squareoff_.htm.
233. See Anderson, supra note 69, at 637. However, one non-partisan research
organization, the Employment Policy Foundation, examined California records on H-1B
petitions in the computer industry. They reported that the actual average wage paid H-1B
workers was fifteen percent higher than the prevailing wage, and in some specialized areas
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administration, Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.) and Secretary of
Labor Robert Reich worked to keep the issue in the forefront by pushing
for legislation to provide greater "worker protection." They alleged that
the programs in place for the employment of foreign workers have had an
234
adverse impact on the American worker.
Countering the perception that employers use the H-1B program to
hire cheap labor, a governmental affairs consultant for Hewlett-Packard
says it is not a bargain to utilize the H-1B option for locating and hiring
employees.235 "HP found that the relocation, applications, and legal fees to
convert an H-1B worker to permanent-resident status with a green card
averaged $15,000 to $20,000 per worker," says Mary Dee Beall.236
However, while HP may employ H-1B workers with the intention of
converting their status to a permanent status, this is not the case with many
users of the program who instead look for highly skilled, temporary
labor.237
To negate common claims that employers and employees misuse H-
1B visas (specifically, the requirement of "specialty skilled" employees and
the prevailing wage requirements), the Immigration and Naturalization
Service published a report in 2002 documenting the demographics of H-1B235
users. The report, entitled "Report on Characteristics of Specialty
Occupation Workers (H-1B)," was as mandated by the American
239Competitiveness and Workforce Improvement Act. It detailed usage for
FY 2001 and contained the following information on the users of the H-1B
visa: "98.7% of all H-1B visa holders have at least a Bachelor's degree,
as high as twenty-nine percent higher. This report indicates that the market sets the wage
rates, rather than government regulations. Additionally, the group found no evidence to
conclude that large numbers of H-1B temporary workers have any "measurable impact on
wages or job opportunities of native workers." Id at 640.
234. Id. at 637.
235. Khirallah, supra note 45.
236. Id. The CIO and senior VP for Owens Corning, based in Toledo, Ohio, says H-1B
workers are not cheaper than American workers. He instead says they focus on finding the
most qualified worker for the job and then look at the immigration status of the individual.
Id. Information Technology Association of America president Harris N. Miller claims that
by factoring in the "additional costs of visa-processing, legal, and other fees ... employers
actually pay more, not less, for H-1B workers." Miller, supra note 122.
237. See Ramachandran v. Blue Star Infotech, 2002-LCA-8 (June 4, 2002), available at
http://www.oalj.dol.gov/publicina/decsn/O2]caO8a.htm.
238. Austin T. Fragomen, Jr. & Steven C. Bell, H-lB Admissions for FY 2002 Less Than
Half of FY 2001's Levels, IMMIGR. Bus. NEWS & COMMENT, Sept. 15, 2002, available at 2002
WL 2020096.
239. See American Competitiveness and Workforce Improvement Act of 1998 § 418.
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confirming that H-1B's are on the whole highly educated and skilled. 24 0
The report stated 58% of H-1B users are working in computer-related
occupations. Data on compensation was also reported, stating the median
income for computer-related professionals was $58,000, and the overall
median income for FY 2001 was $55,000, with the 75th percentile earning
$72,000.24
1
An outspoken critic of immigration based in Washington D.C. is the
242Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR). FAIR is a non-
profit, public interest group of "concerned citizens who share a common
belief that the unforeseen mass immigration that has occurred over the last
30 years should be curtailed. 2 43 FAIR states it is not alone in its campaign
against programs like the H-1B visa, contending that the need of American
big business for specialty skilled employees is unsubstantiated.2 "
Principles set forth by FAIR disagree with U.S. policy of creating
programs, like the H-1B visa, that make it very attractive for specialty-
skilled laborers to leave their home countries to work in the U.S. FAIR
opposes this policy, stating "the United States should not contribute to a
brain drain that entices away the skilled and talented who are desperately
needed in their homelands; we should meet our need for skilled
professionals by training and retraining our own."'2 45 Interestingly, another
vocal opponent to the H-1B visa program, Rep. Tom Tancredo (R-Co.),
argues the "brain drain" is happening to U.S. workers in reverse. Rep.
Tancredo with charges employers are practicing ageism by replacing older
U.S. workers with younger foreign workers thereby wasting American
talent. 6
240. Fragomen & Bell, supra note 238.
241. Id.




245. FAIR: Our Principle, at http://www.fairus.org/html/02001710.htm (last visited Feb.
10, 2002)
246. Rep. Trancedo claims that a large pool of foreign H-1B workers, unwilling to make
too many demands on their employers in hopes of obtaining a green card, are replacing
older American workers resulting in careers cut unnaturally short. He claims it is often
difficult for programmers to obtain programming work after the age of forty. "Thus, older
programmers, who have the potential for more productive years of work, are forced into
other kinds of work, in a kind of domestic 'brain drain' that wastes the talents of American
workers." This brain drain is caused by U.S. employers' brain drain from overseas,




Despite the enforcement provisions set forth in the law intended to
deal with abuse, formal complaints appear to be rare and the Department
of Labor admittedly has not given proper oversight to the program
247participants. As previously discussed, the Congress intended aS • 248
complaint-driven process for investigating H-1B violations. Accusations
by H-1B opponents continue concerning violations of the program
including such practices as "benching," the removal of an H-1B employeeS 249
from the payroll when his or her services are temporarily not required;
the use of H-1B visas by "job-shops;" '' prevailing wage violations;25' and
other LCA violations. M
C. Job Shop Violations
Job shops are the primary source of complaints of abuse of the Labor
Condition Application and H-lB program. 3 Job shops are companies
who hire personnel with skills in specific areas and send those employees
to perform services for clients, usually at the client's location.5  Job shops
are similar to the more commonly known staffing companies, and
specialize in foreign workers. The job shop receives a fee from the client
for placing employees and pays the employee a salary, often taking an
additional fee from the employee for placement.255  "Frequently, the
employee is required to enter into an adhesion contract with the job shop,
which contains substantial penalties for breaching the term of the
employment contract, or for going to work for one of the job shop's
clients."'2 56 Additional legislation enacted by Congress in the American
Competitiveness and Workforce Improvement Act prohibits an employer
from requiring the nonimmigrant employee to pay the enhanced filingf 257
fee, a common practice prior to the legislative reform when an employee
terminated employment prematurely.
247. B. Halliday, supra note 47, at 50.
248. See Anderson, supra note 69, at 644.





254. Id. at 50.
255. B. Halliday, supra note 47, at 51.
256. Id.
257. See American Competitveness and Workforce Improvement Act of 1998 § 414
(codified at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(19)(i) (2002)).
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Such was the case with a complaint filed by fifty-three former
employees of the John Pickle Company based in Tulsa, Oklahoma."' The
employees were Indian nationals employed under the H-1B visa program
by the John Pickle Company (Pickle) through Al Samit International (Al
259Samit), a job shop located in Bombay, India. Pickle contracted with At
Samit to supply Indian nationals to do welding in a manufacturing facility
in Tulsa.2 Al Samit allegedly "lured" the Indian Nationals to the U.S.
with promises of long-term employment at high wages.26' The job shop
recruited the workers through advertisements in India. 262 The workers
were required to pay a fee up to $2,500 to the job shop for placement with
263
a U.S. employer.
The workers claim in their suit that they were not paid the prevailing
wage set forth in the labor condition application, in addition to allegations
264
of false imprisonment in the factory. It appears that Pickle paid the
employees substantially below the rate set forth in the Labor Condition
• 265
Application and minimum wage requirements per federal law. The
claims made regarding the wage paid to the employees range between
$2.31 to $3.17 hourly.2' 6 An independent observer commented, "It seems
that the company was flagrantly ignoring the minimum-wage laws ....
258. Babu Thanu Chellen, et al. v. John Pickle Co. Inc., No. 02-CV-85 EA (N.D. Okla.
filed Feb. 1, 2002).
259. Tony Blizzard, HI-B Visas Shaft U.S. Workers, Enslave Others, Recent Case of Abuse
of H-1B Visa Workers in the United States Overlooks Bigger Issue, at
http://www.americanfreepress.net/FreeTrade/H1-B-Visas-Shaft U S Workers/hlb_
visasshaft-u-s workers.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2003).
260. Id. This type of work does not seem to comply with the required "specialty
occupation" or the requirement that the H-1B employees have either a Master's Degree or
earn at least $60,000 annually as set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 655.737(b). If the employees do
meet these requirements, the employer is not obligated to the additional requirements
described in 20 C.F.R. §§ 655.738-739.
261. Michael Overall, Pickle Co. Inquiry: Judge Sets Date to Hear Case of Workers,
TULSA WORLD, June 12, 2002, at A9.
262. Id.
263. Blizzard, supra note 259. This is in direct conflict with the AWCIA requirement that
the employer must pay the enhanced filing fee required in the legislation for training of
U.S. workers. While the job shop may argue they will pay the enhanced filing fee and this
fee paid by the employee sets off other fees incurred in placing the applicant, it is difficult
to reconcile the two. Additionally, the $2,500 fee amounts to a fortune for the average
Indian where the average annual income (GNI per capita) in 2002 was $450.00. India At A
Glance, at http://www.worldbank.org/data/countrydata/countrydata.html (last visited Feb.
13, 2003).
264. Chellen, No. 02-CV-85.




[y]ou can't just introduce a middle-man and say 'they aren't our
employees."'" Pickle claims the job shop employed the nonimmigrant
employees, citing a contract with Al Samit to provide workers; therefore
268they were not directly employed by Pickle.
This case is currently being litigated. However, a recurring theme, not
addressed in many of the reported complaints with the Department of
Labor, is the type of employment the nonimmigrant visa workers are
contracted to perform. The allegations and formal complaints mostly
center on the employer not complying with the prevailing wage
requirement, but the complainant, agency and administrative law judges
routinely ignore the type of worker obtaining a visa. While this is
addressed in the Labor Condition Application and presumably, if the
occupation is not determined to be a "specialty occupation" for which a H-
1B classification is appropriate, the LCA would not be approved by the
DOL. However, much of the publicity surrounding the Pickle complaint
has centered on the employment of the Indian workers in welding--a trade
common in the U.S."g Therefore, one can logically conclude that the
perception of the LCA as a rubber-stamp process is correct or the position
was improperly described in the LCA and there was no enforcement by
the DOL or INS.
In contrast to the complaint filed against the John Pickle Company is
a complaint filed by a nonimmigrant employee against her employer,
India-based Blue Star Infotech."' The complainant, Ms. Ramachandran,
worked for USIN International (USIN), a U.S. subsidiary of an Indian
corporation, Blue Star, headquartered in Bombay, India."' She
unsuccessfully filed a wide range of complaints against Blue Star, including
failure to comply with the prevailing wage requirements, denial of benefits
and wage increases, discrimination and retaliation following her complaint,
along with various other INA violations, resulting in her working as a
212
"Sales Manager," outside the classification applied for in the LCA . The
administrative law judge who heard her complaint categorically went
through each charge and supported the finding of the Department of
267. Overall, supra note 261.
268. Blizzard, supra note 259.
269. Id.
270. Ramachandran v. Blue Star Infotech, 2002-LCA-8 (June 4, 2002), available at
http://www.oalj.dol.gov/public/ina/decsn/021ca08a.htm.
271. Id. at 2.
272. Id. at 4.
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Labor administrator that Blue Star did not violate any provision of the
273LCA process.
More important than the court's findings, this case provided a
thorough walk-through of how foreign corporations contract with U.S.
companies to provide foreign workers on a temporary basis, specifically inS 274
the technology sector. This case shows how employers can lawfully act
within the perimeters of the H-1B visa program. While these employers
are commonly referred to as job shops, this case is a good illustration of
how such derogatory generalizations can be unfounded.2"
Blue Star's U.S. company is USIN, a "U.S. marketing subsidiary" of
Indian-based Blue Star. 6 USIN "provides software consulting services to
major corporations around the world.",277 Ms. Ramachandran was paid
$67,200 per year as a sales manager doing sales activities in addition to
supervising other employees, processing INS documents, and finance
278
work. She was responsible for "overseeing and evaluating the
performance of personnel assigned to work at customer locations as well as
administering their direction and operations in accordance with local laws
and regulations in matters pertaining to visas [and] work permits. 279
When a company such as Blue Star, in the business of supplying
temporary workers to act as consultants inside U.S. corporations, places an
employee, the non-immigrant's employment must comply with local
prevailing wage requirements. In addition, if the job shop is an H-1B
dependent employer, the company must comply with the requirement to
search for an available U.S. worker to fill the position prior to placing a H-
1B nonimmigrant employee.' As one can imagine, this process is
cumbersome and bureaucratic for companies often based on the east or
west coasts while placing employees throughout the country. However, it
is necessary for the employer to comply with the INA requirements.
2
The administrative law judge found Blue Star complied with the INAS283
requirements. While there is certain to be abuse by job shops, this is a
documented example of a job shop operating well within the perimeters of
273. Id. at 12.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Ramachandran, 2002-LCA-8, at 2.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 6.
279. Id. at 5.
280. Id. at 6.
281. Id. at 10.




the INA by providing a service to U.S. corporations and paying its
employees who possess the required specialty occupational skills the
284prevailing wage.
D. Is the Criticism Founded?
The negative attitude of the public towards immigration and
temporary nonimmigrant workers is in part a result of socioeconomic
concerns of "a tightening job market, with the increased competitiveness
among labor, frustration over the cost and value of available housing,
anxiety about. . . the catalysts of those concerns . . . not related to
immigration trends, the political powerlessness of recent immigrants
makes them a prime target for scapegoating.,
8 5
While much of the criticism focuses on job shops and comes from big
labor or isolationist organizations, it remains unclear how much of the
criticism is valid. 86 "The Labor Department received 269 complaints
involving abuse of H-1B workers in 2001, up from 140 the year before. It
found violations in 54 cases and ordered companies to pay more than $1.3
million in back wages." 87 Taking the large number of visas processed and
the number of nonimmigrant workers employed in the U.S.,2 8 8 269
complaints is relatively insignificant. From the number of reported cases,
one can draw many conclusions. Possibly employers and employees for
the most part comply with the requirements of the program to the extent
that any differences can be addressed between the parties. Some critics
suggest that the lack of complaints filed is due to the disparity of power
284. Id. at 12.
285. Sabrina Underwood, Comment, Achieving the American Daydream: The Social,
Economic, and Political Inequalities Experienced by Temporary Workers Under the H-1B
Visa program, 15 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 727, 735 (2001) (quoting Susanne Jonas, Rethinking
Immigration Policy and Citizenship in the Americas: A Regional Framework, in
IMMIGRATION: A CIVIL RIGHTS ISSUE FOR THE AMERICAS 147 (Susanne Jonas & Suzie Dod
Thomas eds., 1999)).
286. Historically, organized labor has been a leading critic of allowing foreign labor in the
U.S. based on well documented concerns mostly regarding wage competition leading to
lower wages. However, during the recent debate (summer 2001) led by President Bush,
regarding the grant of amnesty to illegal aliens presently working in the U.S., "[a]fter years
of viewing immigrants as a threat, competing for jobs and depressing wage levels, the
A.F.L.-C.I.O. last year called for amnesty for all illegal workers, seeing immigrants as
potential union members." Eric Schmitt, Ambivalence Prevails in Immigration Policy, N.Y.
TIMES, May 27, 2001, at A12.
287. Khirallah, supra note 45.
28& 1d. (some estimate the current number of H-1B visa holders employed in the U.S.
has reached one million).
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between the employees and employer.2 9 While another possible
explanation lies in the use of the program by the employee as a means to
entering the U.S. workforce all the while understanding that non-
compliance by employers is part of the price to be paid to participate in the
U.S. economy.295 With the enforcement structure currently in place, it is
difficult to determine whether the criticism is founded.
E. The Effects of the Recent Economic Downturn and September 11, 2001
Media reports of fear and hatred of foreigners quickly followed the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.91 "Everyone talks about the
security of the Homeland, and now I find out that the majority of the
software that runs my telephone is developed and supported from India,
where they could damage or place a bug into the code unknowingly,"
292
remarked a concerned New Yorker. Another New Yorker commented,
"How are we supposed to tell the difference between a legitimate [H-1B]
visa person and a terrorist?,1 93 Opponents to the H-1B visa also stepped
up their dialogue, becoming more malicious in their criticism of how
special interests affect legislation since the general suspicion of foreigners
increased following September 11. 214 Concerns over foreigners following
the terrorists attacks have subsided. However, concerns over the
economic changes following the attacks and impending war have increased
the debate over the need for the H-1B visa and a push is on to reduce the
295availability of large numbers of foreign workers.
Rep. Tom Tancredo recently squared off with a leading lobbyist
association for information technology employers, led by Harris N. Miller,
to debate the need for H-lB visas in the declining information technology
sector.' 96 Miller cites "anti-immigration fervor" and "job protectionism" as
the leading voices opposed to H-1B visas. Historically, similar cries have
been heard during economic downturns."'
289. Underwood, supra note 285, at 736.
290. Tancredo, supra note 232.
291. John Soat, "Why Don't We Replace Corporate CEOs with [Foreigners] on the H-1B




294. Khirallah, supra note 45.
295. See Miller, supra note 122; Tancredo, supra note 232.
296. Miller, supra note 122; Tancredo, supra note 232.
297. Miller, supra note 122.
In 1798, the Alien and Sedition Acts targeted immigrants considered
politically incorrect by the John Adams administration. The Know-
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Rep. Tom Tancredo believes the "H-1B program is not necessary and
actually is harmful to our nation's interests. The sooner Congress scales it
back, the better., 29" Tancredo claims "the 'temporary stopgap while we
retrain workers' line is a ruse. 299 It is an attempt by industry to continue
to deceive Congress and the public into continuing the availability of cheap
and docile foreign labor.3 ° However, as discussed previously, his concerns
are not supported by recent applications and issuances of H-1B visas as
reported in the September 2002 INS report3
In a report issued by the Immigration and Naturalization Service
dated September 15, 2002, during the first three quarters of the 2002 fiscal
year (October 1, 2001 through June 30, 2002), 60,500 H-1B petitions were
approved against the cap of 195,000.302 The number of petitions for the
third quarter FY 2001 was 130,700, making the 2002 visa count less than
half of the previous year total.3°3 This number does not reflect the same
calculations as the previous years. Due to recent legislation, the number of
H-1B petitions does not include extensions and new employer petitions,
nor does it include the exemptions provided for non-immigrants working
for educational institutions or nonprofit research organizations. °
However, taking these considerations into account, the overall number of
petitions and issued H-1B visas is significantly lower than in prior years.30'
The cap remains at 195,000 until the cap returns to the 65,000 level at the
306
end of FY 2003. It is likely the cap will not be reached based on the
Nothing political party of the 1850s sought to bar foreigners from public
office and expand the period of naturalization from five to 21 years. The
Alien Contract Labor Law of 1885 prevented foreigners from working
under contract in the United States, and the Expatriation Act of 1907
rescinded the citizenship of American women who married foreign
nationals. The United States virtually shut the door on immigration
during the Great Depression of the 1930s, and the last restrictions against
Chinese immigrants weren't eliminated until 1964.
Id.
298. Tancredo, supra note 232 (referring to the additional enhanced filing fee collected
during the H-1B application process for workforce training).
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Fragomen & Bell, supra note 238.
302. Id.
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technology sector economy until FY 2004 (assuming the cap reverts back
to 65,000). 07
Professionals that work intimately with employers who utilize H-1B
visa employees cite slumping economic conditions, as opposed to concerns
and reluctance to hire foreign workers following September 11, as the
reason for the decrease in need for H-lB workers.3°8
Another effect of the concern over foreigners following the terrorists
attacks is the resulting delays in processing all paperwork related to
foreigners entering the U.S.3°9 Quick action on applications is no longer
realistic, personal interviews are commonplace and visa refusal rates areh._ 310
higher. Recent legislation passed the U.S. House and Senate in response
to concern of the processing delays. On October 3, 2002, the U.S. Senate
passed a measure that allows H-1B nonimmigrants nearing the permitted
six-year limit (commonly referred to as "maxing out") to extend the period
of stay if a labor certification was filed and has been pending for at least
365 days.311
While it is expected to decrease, the anticipated use of the H-1B visa
in this period of economic downturn remains uncertain. "H-1Bs are more
likely to be used in jobs for which it's hard to find U.S. workers, such as
programming in Arabic or Chinese," says David Pritchard, a senior
- 312
director of technology staffing for Microsoft. However, Microsoft
reports they plan to hire fewer H-1B employees due to the increased
domestic talent-pool available now following industry cutbacks in the
technology sector.313 Another company who intends to continue to use H-
3141B workers despite the slow down is Hewlett-Packard. During the past
two years, HP used the H-1B visa program to hire many software
engineers.15 It now plans to focus its use of the program in areas requiring
more specialized skills such as scientists involved in certain research
307. Id.
308. Tischelle George, But as Economy Declines, Requests Have Already Fallen Off,
INFORMATION WEEK (Sept. 9, 2002), at http://www.informationweek.com/story/IWK2002
0906S0032.
309. See Bell, supra note 3.
310. Id.
311. Austin T. Fragomen, Jr. & Steven C. Bell, Congress Approves Expansion of
Provision for H-1B Extension Beyond Six Years; President to Sign the Measure into Law
Shortly, IMMIGR. Bus. NEWS & COMMENT, Oct. 15, 2002, available at 2002 WL 31296091.






projects or specialists with unique talents often found at technology
conferences.316
VI. CONCLUSION
The current economy may make the continuing debate over allowing
increased numbers of nonimmigrant workers under the H-lB visa program
unnecessary. As the debate grew exponentially just two years ago while a
new industry-friendly administration took office, factors such as
September 11, 2001 hastened the economic recession. In turn, the need for
H-1B workers declined, quieting the debate as attention turned elsewhere.
A significant change in immigration policy as a whole followed
September 11, 2001. To cite but a few examples of the dramatic shift in
focus: legislation nearing passage to enable "individuals who have fallen
out of status but who had been sponsored based on qualifying employment
or familial relationship, to nonetheless apply for permanent residence"3 '7
now appears exceedingly unlikely; talk of negotiations for possible
amnesty programs has ceased; opponents to the H-1B program have
increased and stepped up organized efforts to roll back the program;
additional oversight and obligations on educational institutions regarding
student visa programs is now required; and Congress has recently
expanded the "INS's authority to detain immigrants through the passage
of the PATRIOT Act. 318
There is much left unsettled in the area of immigration law in the
United States. While many who work in immigration employment law on
a daily basis hope reorganization of the Immigration and Naturalization
Service is high atop Congress' list, following the events of September 11,
2001 and the war on terrorism, it is unlikely with other pressing issues at
hand.319 In the coming months with the new Republican-led executive and
legislative branches,320 many involved in immigration law expect Congress
316. Id.
317. Beth Peters & Marshall Fitz, To Repeal or Not to Repeal: The Federal Prohibition on
In-State Tuition For Undocumented Immigrants Revisited, 168 WEST'S EDuc. L. REP. 2
(Oct. 24, 2002).
31& Id. The USA PATRIOT Act was enacted on October 26, 2001 in an attempt to
dramatically tighten controls on suspected terrorists.
319. Namely, the apparent imminent war with Iraq, the worldwide search for terrorists,
and slumping economy.
320. CNN, November 5, 2002 Elections, available at http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/
2002/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2002).
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to take up immigration reform, restructuring and reprioritizing the U.S.
immigration bureaucracy.3 1
There has been much public debate to split the INS into two different
agencies, with one focused on the procedural aspects of immigration
services and the other focused on enforcement duties. 3 2 Much remains to
be seen how this or other proposals will affect the employers and
employees who utilize the H-1B visa program. With the election of
President Bush in 2000 and the recent shift in the control of Congress to
323the Republican Party, many hope the shift of power will solidify Bush's
ushering in a "pro-immigrant wing of the Republican Party.",124 With the
pending threats of war and international terrorism all too real in the daily
lives of Americans, maintaining a political and ideological balance
between the creation of our nation by immigrants, the ideal of the
"American Dream," and the reality of the world as it exists today, will
continue to shape immigration law and policy.
321. Scott M. Borene, Globalizing the High-Tech Workforce, Recent Federal Legislation
has Eased the Burden for Employers Seeking to Hire and Retain Top-Flight Talent From
Abroad, 58 BENCH & B. MINN. 21, 23 (Dec. 2001).
322. Id.
323. November 5, 2002 elections created a Republican majority in both the U.S. Senate
(Republicans 51, Democrats 46) and House of Representatives (Republicans 226,
Democrats 204). See CNN, supra note 320.
324. Schmitt, supra note 286.
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